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Abstract 
Operation Fortress is a multi-agency initiative to tackle drugs and violence in 
Southampton. The researchers examined similar initiatives to identify ‘what 
works’ in reducing the harms associated with drug trafficking and use in 
communities and critically evaluated Fortress in the light of that analysis. It 
was found that the initiative had incorporated much of the learning from 
similar partnership projects and had built on their successes. The purposively 
chosen research sample was relatively small. Nevertheless, the researchers are 
satisfied that the findings are representative of the wider population. Research 
respondents highlighted as key: the expertise of the operation’s police leaders; 
their focus on reducing harm in communities rather than on performance 
targets; their effective communication with partners and with their 
communities; and, particularly, the marketing of the operation which firmly 
established the positive value of the ‘Fortress’ brand. Fortress should be 
celebrated as an example of good practice in partnership working. The study 
also suggests the need for more effective national and regional support for 
local efforts if successes like this are in future to represent partnership norms.  
 
Key words: multi-agency working; partnership; rapid evidence assessment; 
integrated operating model  
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Introduction 
This paper presents the results of a rapid evidence assessment of Hampshire 
Constabulary and Southampton City Council’s Operation Fortress, which was 
commissioned by the force. The assessment was carried out between June and 
August 2013, just over one year into the two-year life of the operation. Its 
purpose was to answer the question; ‘To what extent is Operation Fortress 
achieving its aims of preventing or reducing people’s involvement in drugs and 
violent crime, either as victims or offenders’? 
 
Methodology 
We addressed the research question through a review of the most relevant 
existing literature, by observing Fortress internal meetings and public briefings, 
and by conducting a series of semi-structured interviews (n=12) with a 
purposive sample of individuals intimately involved in the operation.  
As the time available to carry out the evaluation was extremely limited 
(just 90 days), the Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) method was used. The 
first phase of this assessment was a search of the existing literature on multi-
agency interventions relevant to the activity under investigation. The aim of that 
examination was to critically analyse similar studies to identify what has proven 
to be successful in preventing or reducing people’s involvement in drugs and 
violent crime. That assessment was made using a scale devised by Sherman et al 
(1997) at the University of Maryland. They argued that strong evidence of 
causality can only be shown by studies using a robust comparison group design. 
Only seven of the papers we collected (authored by: Butler et al, 2004; Pitts, 
2007; Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007; Centre for Social Justice 2009; Kinsella, 
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2011; Home Office, 2011; and van Staden et al, 2011) met the ‘robust’ criterion 
and these were identified for detailed assessment.  
Our literature suggested the following key indicators of success in 
partnership working: the need for a consistent focus on problem solving; visible 
and committed leadership; effective engagement with all partners; the targeting 
of behaviours; effective marketing of the partnership initiative; the effective and 
consistent exploitation of intervention opportunities; the establishment of an 
effective mechanism for exchanging information; and the participation in the 
initiative of community and voluntary groups. 
The next step was to assess the extent to which those indicators had 
influenced operational plans and actions. Interview respondents from the force 
and its partners were invited to reflect upon those indicators. Due to the limited 
time available to complete the study, we selected a purposive sample of 
respondents from the operational team and their partners. Respondents were 
chosen for their professional knowledge, their experiences of the operation, or 
their knowledge of drug trafficking and violence in Southampton 
 
Limitations of the research 
We recognise the limitations of the chosen method.  There are both pros and 
cons to the REA approach (see for example Joliffe and Farrington, 2007; 
Davies, 2003) on that subject). However, REAs have become an accepted way of 
carrying out research in the social sciences and have been used extensively as a 
way of harnessing the best available research evidence on social problems and 
the interventions of social agencies. It has been argued that determining what is 
already known about the issue in question as a precursor to a new evaluation in 
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the same field is both ‘obvious and vitally important’ and that the REA 
represents an acceptable compromise between ‘what is desirable’ and ‘what is 
possible’ (Civil Service, 2013, p.1).  
We also are cognisant of the limitations of purposive sampling. However, 
in this case it was methodologically consistent and an efficient method that 
balanced the desirable with the possible and delivered real insights into the 
operation and the challenges facing social agencies in the city. That approach 
allowed us to say something meaningful about the efforts of public sector 
professionals in those contexts. We acknowledge that as a result our analysis 
necessarily reflects a relatively narrow, though we argue well-informed, set of 
views on the operation, its processes, and outcomes. 
This paper is based solely on publicly available information and semi-
structured interviews with research respondents. The research team did not 
request, and were not made privy to any sensitive Fortress, Hampshire 
Constabulary, or Southampton City Council data. 
 
Research Findings 
This section presents the findings from the interviews sorted according to the 
discrete themes (the key indicators) we identified. It also addresses the issue of 
the force’s proposed exit strategy, a subject that (as might be expected) was of 
great interest to the force and its partners. 
Without exception, respondents spoke of the way in which those leading 
Fortress consistently sought to move the police beyond an orthodox crime 
control agenda. A clear message was that though the police recognized that 
performance data was important, a focus on such data can skew activity and 
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outputs. An argument advanced forcefully and consistently was that Fortress 
represented a new approach to the problems of drugs and violence in 
Southampton. That approach relied on more sophisticated efforts by police and 
partners to restrict the supply of illicit drugs, to reduce the demand for drugs, 
and to rebuild communities blighted by the violence associated with 
problematic drug use. A voluntary sector respondent said that they felt that the 
police’s efforts in this regard were consistently well-intentioned and 
praiseworthy. Particularly, when the police’s attempts to achieve a balance 
between enforcement and treatment were being made against the background 
of the ‘inherent contradictions’ in Government policy towards the policing of 
drugs. 
Respondents commented on the impact of Fortress on the supply of 
drugs and on the levels of violence in Southampton. Overall, the impression was 
that Fortress had been very successful in restricting supply. We saw crime data 
produced by the force that supported a police respondent’s assertion that drug 
related violence in the city had reduced, quarter on quarter, during the life of 
the operation. Respondents from Southampton’s Drugs and Alcohol Action 
Team (DAAT) and from the voluntary sector said that Fortress had been less 
effective in reducing demand for drugs in the city but that needed to be seen in 
the context of the market, which was in flux. A DAAT respondent said that the 
demographic of heroin use in the city was changing and that there was potential 
for a significant shift in the medium to longer term. For example, he had 
observed a noticeable reduction in the number of heroin and crack cocaine users 
in the city and an increase in users purchasing legal highs via the Internet 
(which we argue, provides another dimension to the ‘local to global’ debate). 
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Respondents consistently talked about their commitment to finding long-
term solutions for what were recognized universally as complex social problems. 
A drugs worker said that in their experience the level of cooperation and 
communication between the police and their partners was ‘unprecedented’, 
which was a hugely significant factor in partners’ commitment to finding new 
ways of dealing with those problems. Police respondents highlighted the 
expertise that the Fortress team had developed in addressing the problems of 
drugs, violence, and organized crime in Southampton.  
Perhaps, one of the most innovative ways of supporting communities was 
the joint commissioning (by the police and Southampton City Council) of the 
play, ‘Mum can you lend me £20 quid’?  A gritty true-life portrayal of the lives of 
twin brothers who became addicted to heroin. The play was extremely well 
received by its audiences in the city. Some concern was expressed that the 
expertise would be lost at the conclusion of the operation. However, several 
respondents argued that this should be tempered with the understanding that 
staff would transfer their knowledge to their new workplaces.  
A head teacher said that Fortress had allowed its partners to feel that 
there was some redress for those individuals whose lives were affected by drug-
related criminal activity. The head praised a lesson plan that Fortress had 
developed and shared with schools for helping to expand knowledge of how to 
deal with those issues, across service providers. They felt that more work could 
usefully be done in that way. For example, they hoped that the police would 
offer a short free continuous professional development (CPD) experience for 
teachers that would enable them to use the experience and knowledge they 
gained from the police in lesson planning and school assemblies. 
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Key to any problem solving process is information about the nature and 
extent of the problem that needs to be confronted. In that context, two issues 
emerged that we feel should be of concern to the force’s commanders. The first 
was whether or not what had developed in Southampton was a ‘gang’ problem of 
the kind seen in many of the larger urban conurbations both here in the UK and 
elsewhere. The second was the way in which, despite the efforts of some in the 
force, a focus on priority crime (that is, crime measured by the Home Office) 
may have skewed the force’s intelligence collection and analysis processes.  
All the research respondents commented on the quality of the leadership 
of the operation. Its leaders were seen as expert, highly visible, and fully 
committed to achieving the operation’s aims. One voluntary sector respondent 
said that for all that the police had been ‘really good’ in reaching out to partners, 
there still was a perception that Fortress was a partnership approach that the 
police were controlling. However, the same respondent also said that the 
operation had been led ‘extremely ably’, which reflects the challenge the police 
face in achieving an appropriate balance in multi-agency work of this kind. 
The partnership was made up of the police, the city council, local drugs 
action and youth offending teams, and community and voluntary groups. 
Overall our impression was that respondents recognized effective partnership 
working was key to achieving Fortress’s aims. Police respondents said that they 
were wholly committed to the multi-agency approach. Partners publicly had 
expressed their support for the operation from the outset and that support 
seemed never to have wavered. Certainly, we were struck by the enthusiasm 
shown for the project by our non-police respondents. 
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All respondents considered the marketing of the operation one of its 
greatest strengths. Our research suggests that the Fortress brand has been 
established and overwhelmingly is viewed as positive by police, partners and the 
communities of Southampton. That the brand was so successful was the product 
of careful planning and the identification of a Fortress middle manager as a 
single point of contact for partners and also for the rest of the force. 
The enforcement elements of any intervention should be implemented 
consistently. Researchers examining similar initiatives have found that the most 
effective strategies use community groups and outreach programmes to help 
pursue a policy that balanced the ‘carrots’ of social intervention programmes 
with the ‘sticks’ of law enforcement interventions. Respondents felt that the 
Hampshire force was achieving that same balance. 
Respondents were especially keen to talk about the reflexivity of those 
who led the operation and the way in which, as a result, Fortress had evolved. In 
the first phase of the operation there had been a focus on enforcement activity, 
which had attracted lots of media attention and established the brand. However, 
that had quickly given way to approaches that engaged partners; that utilized 
‘softer’ policing skills and a wider range of police staff. For example, a member 
of the force’s communication team described the recent execution of a drugs 
search warrant by a team from the force’s Western area. Once the searched 
premises were secured, members of the local safer neighbourhoods teams (SNT) 
went into the local community to explain the action and to field any complaints.  
The SNT also utilized the, highly visible and readily identifiable, Fortress-
liveried police van. That linked the policing activity undertaken to the Fortress 
brand even though the commitment of the operation’s resources was minimal. A 
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DAAT respondent said that Fortress staff had been good at listening to people 
and understanding that low level perpetrators were also victims of crime; that 
had translated into a different experience in terms of the consequences of arrest 
and the way they were been treated whilst in detention. 
All respondents agreed that the initiative had encouraged information 
sharing between the partners and improved upon the force’s ability to 
communicate with its partners. The key factors in that improvement were the 
respective managements’ buy-in to the principle of sharing, and the 
development of cooperative relationships between practitioners within the 
discrete elements of the partnership. Some concerns were expressed that 
information was not always shared on a case by case basis when needed but 
respondents said that at the strategic governance level, there was an overt 
commitment to data sharing from most partners (the National Health Service 
was seen as the one cause for concern). 
 Police respondents felt that information within police databases at the 
national, regional, force, and local databases was not shared as well as it might 
have been. We saw scant evidence of the influence of the integrated operating 
model (IOM), introduced by the last Government (Home Office, 2009) and 
lauded by the current Coalition (Home Office, 2011, p.16) as the means by which 
police would deliver a ‘tiered response’ to the crime problems associated with 
gang crime. The same group felt that information largely was shared effectively 
enough to ensure that partners’ services were deployed appropriately when the 
need was identified and also that other public-facing communication methods 
(such as the use of social networking media) were effective in disseminating 
information, asking for assistance, etc., from the wider community.  
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Overall, respondents felt that Fortress built on existing partnerships such 
as Southampton Connect, the Safe City Partnership, the local safeguarding 
children and adults' boards, and the Partnership of Southampton Education 
Forum. They also felt that community and voluntary groups consistently were 
engaged by the police in productive ways and cited various examples of the 
engagement in community activities of Fortress staff.  
Life after Fortress – essentially when funding ended - exercised the 
minds of police respondents to a much greater degree than non-police 
respondents. That is not to suggest that the latter were unappreciative of the 
police’s efforts; far from it. However, it does once again point to the central 
challenge of effective partnership work; the competing and often conflicting 
aims, organizational imperatives, and cultures of partners and the immense 
challenge of keeping multi-agency initiatives like this on track. 
 
Analysis of findings 
In terms of Fortress’effectiveness, respondents left us in no doubt that they felt 
that the operation was achieving its aims of restricting the supply of drugs and 
of raising the profile of partnership work and youth crime in Southampton. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the complexity of the drugs issue in modern 
society, Fortress was perceived to have had less success in reducing the demand 
for drugs. Whilst there has been universal support for the operation and a 
substantial commitment to it by partners, respondents from the city council and 
the DAAT felt that their respective organisations could have done more to 
support the operation. For the council, that would involve a more effective 
implementation of its youth crime agenda and working more effectively with the 
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voluntary sector to identify vulnerable people in communities. For the DAAT, 
that would require more resources for its offender management and drug 
referral processes. The city council respondent said that in their view the police 
‘had done the best they could in the climate they currently have to work within’, 
which we argue is about as unequivocal a statement of support for those leading 
the operation as one could reasonably expect to hear.  
Many respondents (police and non-police alike) suggested that the 
Fortress brand was so well established, and had achieved so much, that it 
should be considered a permanent fixture in the force; a template for all future 
partnership work. A police respondent supported consideration of a rebranding 
exercise in which the word ‘Operation’ (which to them inferred police 
dominance of the partnership, and impermanence) should be excised from the 
brand. However, respondents also recognized that initiatives like Fortress can 
be difficult to sustain if targets for priority crimes (such as burglary and 
robbery) are not met. As many researchers have found, performance targets - 
which frequently attract scarce resources on the basis of ‘what gets measured 
must be done’ – always have the potential to skew organizational behaviour (see 
for example Collier, 2006)). 
It has long been recognized that the police alone cannot resolve the 
problem of crime. Underpinned by an ethos that can be traced back to Robert 
Peel, Britain’s police service has always relied on the assistance of its 
communities to tackle crime and disorder, and on the (at least tacit) approval of 
its communities for the actions the police take on their behalf - the principle of 
policing by consent. There is nothing new about partnership working, which is 
so central to the Fortress mission. Executive recognition of the efficacy of formal 
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partnership as long ago as 1998, led to the statutory establishment of crime 
reduction (later community safety) partnerships via the Crime and Disorder Act. 
In reality, achieving the goals of restricting supply, reducing demand and 
rebuilding blighted communities requires energy, commitment and, above all, 
synergy between relevant partners. However as Gilling (2005, p.737) has 
argued, partnership working represents a complex social phenomenon in which 
individual actors must put aside their own ‘baggage’ (in the shape of their 
professional ideologies, and occupational and organisational cultures) in the 
interest of the partnership and the communities that they serve. Partnerships 
require the investment of time and energy from every participant, if they are to 
be effective (Gilling, 2005) 
Recently, the whole notion of partnership has been boosted by the 
announcement of Home Office policies that have sought to refocus law 
enforcement efforts to tackle organized crime in ways that ‘put an emphasis on 
preventative and self-protection work, alongside a focus on enforcement 
activity’ (Home Office, 2011, p.3). That is, in ways which ‘STEM the 
opportunities for organized crime… STRENGTHEN enforcement against 
organized criminals… [and] SAFEGUARD communities, businesses and the 
state (Home Office, 2011, p.7); and which will allow the NCA and its partners to 
PURSUE (offenders), PREVENT (organized crime), PROTECT (communities) 
and PREPARE (for the consequences of those crimes) (Home Office, 2013).1   
Arguably, one of the drivers for those developments is a greater 
understanding of the reality of organized crime in Western democracies. Often, 
it is not the scourge or plague visited on innocent communities by committed, 
wicked, and venal ‘others’, as it has so often been portrayed, but a largely 
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disorganized (often chaotic), profit-driven, activity that may be directed by 
outsiders but which seeks (and usually finds) willing collaborators, both as foot 
soldiers and as customers, within communities. The belief that the increasing 
involvement of outsiders (in this case, groups and individuals from the London 
area) in organized crime in Southampton was causing previously unseen levels 
of conflict and violence in the city was a significant driver for the Fortress plan. 
Certainly, there was evidence to support the view that some outsiders were to 
blame for the upsurge in violence in the city.  
Beyond that, during the period of the research, Sussex Police (a near 
neighbour of the Hampshire force) operated Operation ‘Reduction’ in Brighton. 
This was a collaboration between treatment organisations, the police and the 
council that aimed to get treatment for low-level users and dealers, thereby 
allowing more police resources to be diverted towards the traffickers and 
perpetrators of violence. That force too has reported the increasing influence of 
London-based criminals in the south coast drugs trade with London dealers 
targeting the vulnerable to use their flats in the towns of Brighton and Hove as 
the base for their drug-running operations in a technique known as ‘cuckooing’ 
(Vowles, 2013, p.1). That suggests that the developments in Southampton 
described above may be part of a wider shift in the organized crime and drugs 
milieus. 
An alternative explanation for the increasing violence in Southampton 
was advanced by two non-police respondents. They, separately, reported that 
some of their clients pointed to the success of previous Hampshire Police-led 
anti-drug initiatives, (Operations Phoenix and Phoenix II – which were known 
as the ‘Rat on a Rat’ campaigns) in removing local dealers, as being at the root 
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of the problem (see Southampton Safer City Partnership, 2014). The suggestion 
was that the police action had created a vacuum that had been filled by those, 
outsiders, now directing the trade.  
We should qualify that statement; it was not advanced as truth but rather 
as an impression of the views held by some in Southampton’s communities. 
Furthermore, it was not a view that found much favour with the police 
respondents. However, there is research which suggests that police intervention 
in drug markets can lead to a dislocation of the market that can in turn lead to 
an increase in violence as new suppliers compete for custom (see for example 
UKDPC, 2012, p.14); the idea is not without foundation even if it may not 
necessarily be true in this case.  
Initially, respondents seemed to disagree on the extent to which the 
problems that Fortress was created to ameliorate, were ‘home grown’ or were 
attributable to outsiders. Though a consensus emerged that the increase in 
violence was due to the exploitation of local suppliers and local markets by 
criminals (according to one police respondent) ‘higher up the food chain’ in 
London. The same respondent advanced the theory that London-based criminal 
networks were ‘spreading their wings’ to avoid enforcement activity in the 
capital and to escape already ‘saturated’ drugs markets. Unknown, and therefore 
not targeted by the police in Southampton, these ‘cuckoos’ had been able to 
develop their new ventures with relatively little hindrance before the 
establishment of Fortress.  
As the reader saw earlier, there was a ‘reluctance’ (a word used 
repeatedly by respondents) to term the problems in Southampton ‘gang-related’ 
though the word ‘gang’ also cropped up in most of our interviews. Clearly, there 
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is nervousness around the term based on its potential to harm, through labelling 
and the consequent stigmatization, the very communities that Fortress seeks to 
help and support. We are sensitive to those views. However, we feel that at the 
heart of the solution to any problem is the accurate definition of that problem 
and that the question of just what problem in Southampton the partnership is 
trying to resolve, is worthy of further analysis and reflection.    
Tangentially, the same respondent described the dearth of information 
on drugs available to the police before the Fortress initiative. That was 
attributed to too great a focus on priority crime and an unwillingness to reward 
individuals for drugs information, which of course discouraged potential 
informers coming forward. That view was advanced by a single individual and 
we were unable to corroborate it in the time available to us so we resist the 
temptation to make what might be considered to be sweeping generalisations 
about police commanders’ focus and grip. However, whilst we recognise the 
many and varied challenges facing police forces, we argue that the danger of not 
taking cross border crime sufficiently seriously and in that context, effective 
environmental scanning and the accurate identification of problems are 
absolutely key to developing a comprehensive and accurate intelligence picture 
and securing National Intelligence Model compliance.2  
The IOM was designed: to encourage the direction of law enforcement 
resources in ways that have the greatest harm reduction impact on organized 
crime; to ensure that all government agencies play their part in that process; 
and to ensure that all partners are engaged effectively at home and abroad 
(Home Office, 2009). Despite the introduction of Regional Organized Crime 
Units (ROCU),3  the shortcomings of the Serious Organized Crime Agency 
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(SOCA) (which were well known to the Home Office and to policing 
professionals though rather less well documented) have meant that the Home 
Office’s plans for an effective system for the direction and coordination of 
resources (known to the police as a tasking and coordinating process – or ‘T&C’) 
has not been as well developed as it might have been. The result has been that 
organized criminals and cross border crime has not been tackled as effectively 
and intervention opportunities have not been exploited well enough. It is to be 
hoped that SOCA’s replacement, the National Crime Agency (NCA), will provide 
greater assistance in that context. Certainly, the rhetoric emerging from the new 
agency suggests that partnership working in ways that meet the expectations of 
stakeholders and communities will be central to its efforts (NCA, 2013). 
Our research suggested that these developments are significant in the 
context of initiatives like Operation Fortress. Certainly an effective ‘T&C’ 
process that provided a forum for the exchange of information and best practice, 
which supported forces and allowed them to obtain regional and national 
assistance in dealing with cross-border crime would mitigate the risk of mission 
drift at the local level. Two facts that emerged in the research gave us cause to 
doubt that the existing arrangements were sufficiently well-developed. The first 
was that the Fortress police staff we spoke to were unaware of the Brighton 
operation; the second was that the operational team clearly was struggling to 
tackle the cross-border (usually London-based) offenders it identified, and to 
continue to support its neighbourhood teams in Southampton. We were 
satisfied that the members of the force that we interviewed, understood the 
importance of that local response in the contexts of the operation’s legitimacy 
and continuing public support for the police more generally. 
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As we noted earlier, the force’s exit strategy exercised police respondents 
much more than partners. However, there was unanimity that the operation 
should continue in one form or another if the funding was available. The 
preferred option was that Fortress should continue as it is currently configured 
but that view was tempered with the knowledge that the necessary funding 
simply may not be forthcoming. Respondents felt that the next best option 
would be a scaled down version to which all organized anti-drugs and violence 
activity, media releases, etc., would be attributed. However, a fear was 
expressed that without an enforcement capability Fortress would very quickly 
be seen as a ‘toothless tiger’. Even though we recognize the pressures on Police 
and Crime Commissioners and police commanders in this age of austerity for 
the public services, we share those concerns.  
 
Conclusion 
We were set the task of assessing the extent to which Operation Fortress was: 
restricting the supply of illicit drugs; reducing the violence associated with that 
trade; reducing the demand for drugs; and helping to rebuild communities. Our 
research suggests that Fortress restricted drug supply, reduced drug-related 
violence significantly, and had a positive impact on Southampton’s 
communities.  
The evidence that Fortress helped to reduce the demand for drugs is 
equivocal though it must be recognized that activity of this kind has rarely made 
a significant impact on demand. Problematic drug use develops for complex 
reasons. Those may include an individual’s genetic or biological make-up, their 
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personality, their personal and family histories, and their social circumstances. 
Few of those can be influenced by the police in meaningful ways. 
 Significant factors in Fortress’s success (that it shared with other 
successful initiatives) were the leadership of the operation, its focus on reducing 
harm rather than on performance targets, and effective communication with 
partners (that underpinned their efforts to support drug users and secured their 
continuing enthusiastic participation). Where Fortress’s leaders seemed to go 
further than the norm was in their marketing of the operation, which 
established the value of the Fortress brand and consistently struck the right 
balance between celebrating the successes of the operational team and 
disseminating messages that highlight the partnership’s commitment to public 
safety and security. 
 Whilst recognising that this is a small-scale study, we highlight that 
police respondents questioned whether the arrangements that existed in the 
summer of 2013 (under the auspices of the now defunct SOCA) to support 
forces were sufficient to support the kinds of cross-border operations that their 
intelligence assessments suggested also were necessary. In that context, the 
Home Office’s renewed commitment to the IOM and effective partnership 
working, particularly its introduction of the NCA and the enhancement of the 
existing ROCUs, should be welcomed. 
Whether Fortress should or should not be extended, strictly is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, we contend that there are compelling reasons to 
extend the operation even if just like our research respondents we recognise 
today’s financial realities and the competing demands on the force’s executive 
and its Police and Crime Commissioner.  That should not necessarily preclude a 
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search for alternative funding for the existing model or for another model that 
can consolidate the Fortress gains. At the very least, the learning from Fortress 
should be institutionalized as a way of developing policy and promoting best 
practice in partnership working both within and beyond the force and its 
partner agencies. 
                                                                 
1 This framework was first developed for the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. 
The four areas of activity are: prosecuting and disrupting people engaged in serious and 
organized criminality (Pursue); preventing such activity (Prevent); increasing protections 
against such activity (Protect); and reducing the consequences of such activity (Prepare). 
2 The National Intelligence Model (NIM) established a set of standard operating procedures 
for operational policing in England and Wales. 
3 There are currently nine police ROCUs in England and Wales. The vision is that these 
will be increased in number and be co-located with the 18 regional NCA offices. Each 
ROCU should have a Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) coordinator, who is 
responsible for coordinating policing activity with the work of bodies such as local trading 
standards offices and the Environment Agency. 
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